[Stock & Talk] '헤지펀드 대부' 폴슨 공개사과

"중국기업 리스크 과소평가 했다"

'헤지펀드의 대부'로 불리는 존 폴슨 폴슨앤드코(Paulson&Co) 회장(사진)이'반성문'을 이메일로 투자자들에게 보냈다. 캐나다 토론토증권거래소에 상장된 중국 목재회사 시노포레스트(Sino-Forest)에 투자했다가 1억달러가 넘는 손실을 입은 과정을 설명하고 사과하는 내용이다.

반성문은 '죄송합니다(Sorry.Love,John Paulson)'로 시작한다. 그는 시노포레스트에 투자한 경위에 대해 "성장성과 사업 다각화를 믿었기 때문"이라고 밝혔다. "단순한 목재 생산에서 시작해 유통과 판매까지 사업을 확장한데다 중국 경제 성장 및 위안화 절상에 따라 기업가치가 계속 올라갈 것으로 전망했다"는 게 그의 설명이다. 투자결정 과정에서 "회계 보고서를 꼼꼼히 뜯어보는 것은 물론, 생산현장도 방문하고 중국의 임업담당 공무원까지 면담했다"고 해명했다. 폴슨앤드코는 2007년부터 지분을 매입,12.5%까지 지분을 늘렸다.

폴슨 회장이 궁지에 빠진 것은 지난달 말.리서치업체인 '머디워터스(muddy waters)'가 시노포레스트의 분식회계 의혹을 제기하면서 주가가 70% 이상 급락하고 말았다. 폴슨 회장은 "회사가 부정 혐의를 인정하고 있지 않지만 불확실성이 존재한다고 생각해 보유 주식을 모두 팔기로 했다"고 설명했다. 그는 "투자손실이 4억6200만달러라는 이야기도 있지만 최근 주가를 기준으로 한 것이고,매입가를 기준으로 한 실제 손실은 1억600만달러"라며 편지를 끝냈다.

결국 폴슨 회장의 실수는 '차이나디스카운트(중국기업 과소평가)'를 '디스카운트(과소평가)'한 결과로 보인다.

☞ 폴슨 회장 이메일 전문

Dear Sino-Forest investors； Sorry． Love， John Paulson

On June 20， 2011， Paulson & Co． Inc． filed a public regulatory disclosure in Canada reporting that it has sold its funds’ entire position in Sino-Forest Corporation． Our position in Sino-Forest has been the subject of considerable media attention given recent allegations about the company’s financial statements and given Paulson’s status as the company’s largest shareholder． Now that we have sold our position， we can discuss this matter with our investors in more detail． Therefore， we would like to discuss with you why we believed the company was an attractive investment， our due diligence process， the reasons we sold our investment and the impact of the sale on our Advantage funds．

Sino-Forest first came to our attention in January 2007 when Bloomberg News reported that CVC Asia Pacific and Macquarie Bank were considering making an offer for the company． Prior to the appearance of the Bloomberg article， the stock had been trading in the C$7．00 to C$9．00 per share range： on the day the article appeared it rose to C$10．85． We began research on Sino-Forest， and when Sino-Forest stated publicly that no offer from these parties would be forthcoming and the stock fell to the C$9．00 per share range， Paulson started accumulating its first position．

The investment thesis was consistent with the event-driven investment strategy of the Advantage funds， given the possibility of an acquisition or another development such as a re-listing from the Toronto Stock Exchange to a local exchange． The company was also transitioning its business model from purchasing and re-selling trees to a self-sustaining high-yield planting model， and had the opportunity as a natural resources company in a potentially inflationary environment to benefit from Chinese economic growth and developm．

As a passive investor in public companies， Paulson has access to the same information that everyone else in the securities markets does． Like other public market investors， we must rely on audits and underwriter due diligence for comfort that financial statements and disclosures are accurate and reflect the true state of affairs at companies with publicly traded securities．

Our investment team conducted considerable due diligence on Sino-Forest． We reviewed Sino-Forest’s public filings， participated in conference calls with the investment community， followed up privately with management on specific questions， discussed Sino-Forest with analysts that covered the company， and regularly met in-person with management． A member of our team also went to China to visit Sino-Forest’s operations and to meet with a major customer and representatives of the Chinese government on forestry matters．

Paulson reviewed both sides’ written materials， asked questions， and engaged in further independent research， including conversations with the chairman of the special committee about the scope and process of their investigations． Although Sino-Forest steadfastly denies the Muddy Waters allegations， stands by its public disclosures and financial statements and maintains that there is no fraud， we believe significant uncertainties exist and we made the determination to sell our full position and await the results of the independent investigation．

Our decision was also based on the likelihood that even if Sino-Forest’s special committee investigation clears management and supports the public disclosures and financial statements， the stock may remain depressed for an extended period of time． We considered the case of Orient Paper， another company with Chinese operations on which Muddy Waters issued a report． Even though Orient Paper’s own special committee conclusively and publicly rejected the allegations of fraud， the stock price never recovered to its previous levels．

In May 2011， our Sino-Forest position was 31．0 million shares， just over 12．5% of shares outstanding． At that point， net of proceeds from share sales into the market， the average cost basis of our Sino-Forest position was C$7．43 per share． This position was only in the Advantage portfolios and not in any other Paulson strategy． …

We sold the remainder of our Sino-Forest stock in the market from June 6 through June 17， 2011 at an average price of C$4．53 per share． Measured from December 31， 2010 when the stock price was C$23．29 per share， this resulted in a mark-to-market loss on the Sino-Forest position of C$562 million (-2．7% on the Advantage portfolio NAV)． Measured from May 31， 2011 when the stock price was C$19．27 per share， the mark-to-market loss was C$462 million (-2．2% on the Advantage portfolio NAV)．

Because Paulson sold a substantial portion of its Sino-Forest shares between C$19．00 and C$25．00 per share from early 2010 through May 2011， the net realized loss to the Advantage portfolio over the full life of the position was C$106 million．

노경목 기자 autonomy@hankyung.com